Truth, Folly and the Democratic Way
In Folly to Measure Truth and Error, M explores the limits of human understanding. “[T]here is no more notable folly in the world than to reduce these things to the measure of our capacity and competence.” Fair enough; it’s hard to argue with the proposition that there are things of this world that we cannot comprehend. What happened before the big bang? What exactly is this consciousness we experience? However, in light of what we know today, it’s difficult to accept where M next takes this argument. Given the limitations of human knowledge, M insists that we not be critical of those who report events we cannot explain. In short -- miracles. Now it’s one thing not to understand where the universe came from, and quite a different thing to be skeptical of the miracles reported in Augustine’s writings. Did God really stop the sun for Joshua in the valley of Ayalon?
The strange thing is not that M, who after all was a product of his pre-enlightenment times, and apparently a devoutly religious man, argues in favor of the existence of miracles. The odd part is that the very same essay seems to explain how the gullible and uneducated are more prone to accept such reports at face value. “[T]he softer and less resistant the mind, the easier it was to imprint something on it.” But on the heels of this observation, M soon warns against dismissing reports of miraculous events, simply because we cannot explain them, or accept them as likely occurrences.
Even stranger is to examine this essay in conjunction with Repentance. In Repentance, M recognizes the inherent difficulty in knowing anything. “I cannot fix my object; it goes muddled and reeling by a natural drunkenness.” And so, when making decisions in the realm of morals or ethics, M advises us not to look elsewhere for counsel, but rather to trust our own judgment. Now back to the conclusion of Truth and Error, where M advises that, “It is not for us to determine what position of obedience we owe to [the ecclesiastical government].”
Clearly, there is something very odd in the juxtaposition of these two essays. In Repentance, we are urged to trust our own instincts, and not to follow the collective judgment of others. But when we are faced with religious matters, our own instincts and judgments have nothing to say to us. We are instructed to follow the orthodox teachings. Perhaps the problem is that we see M through the lens of our own time, when the churches are no longer absolute, and when the collective judgment of society has become the sovereign. By social compact, we have agreed to govern ourselves by the collective will, and short of the most extreme circumstances (think Nazi Germany), we are bound to submit to that will, whether we like its judgment or not. This elevation of collective judgment, this governance by democratic process, has been accompanied, in large measure, but the sense that, insofar as religious matters are concerned, we can do a pretty fair job of sorting out what’s true and not true. Of course, that too may be a conceit; and our rational examination of these matters may be no closer to the truth than it would have been in M’s time. But I’ll finish with M’s observation that we should, in the final analysis, trust our own judgment about ethical matters: “Do not hold fast, therefore, to their judgment, hold fast to yours.” That seems to apply, in this instance, to the master’s own teachings.
The strange thing is not that M, who after all was a product of his pre-enlightenment times, and apparently a devoutly religious man, argues in favor of the existence of miracles. The odd part is that the very same essay seems to explain how the gullible and uneducated are more prone to accept such reports at face value. “[T]he softer and less resistant the mind, the easier it was to imprint something on it.” But on the heels of this observation, M soon warns against dismissing reports of miraculous events, simply because we cannot explain them, or accept them as likely occurrences.
Even stranger is to examine this essay in conjunction with Repentance. In Repentance, M recognizes the inherent difficulty in knowing anything. “I cannot fix my object; it goes muddled and reeling by a natural drunkenness.” And so, when making decisions in the realm of morals or ethics, M advises us not to look elsewhere for counsel, but rather to trust our own judgment. Now back to the conclusion of Truth and Error, where M advises that, “It is not for us to determine what position of obedience we owe to [the ecclesiastical government].”
Clearly, there is something very odd in the juxtaposition of these two essays. In Repentance, we are urged to trust our own instincts, and not to follow the collective judgment of others. But when we are faced with religious matters, our own instincts and judgments have nothing to say to us. We are instructed to follow the orthodox teachings. Perhaps the problem is that we see M through the lens of our own time, when the churches are no longer absolute, and when the collective judgment of society has become the sovereign. By social compact, we have agreed to govern ourselves by the collective will, and short of the most extreme circumstances (think Nazi Germany), we are bound to submit to that will, whether we like its judgment or not. This elevation of collective judgment, this governance by democratic process, has been accompanied, in large measure, but the sense that, insofar as religious matters are concerned, we can do a pretty fair job of sorting out what’s true and not true. Of course, that too may be a conceit; and our rational examination of these matters may be no closer to the truth than it would have been in M’s time. But I’ll finish with M’s observation that we should, in the final analysis, trust our own judgment about ethical matters: “Do not hold fast, therefore, to their judgment, hold fast to yours.” That seems to apply, in this instance, to the master’s own teachings.